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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAX An Alabama statute 1 imposed an inchoate lien on all property in the state as of
October 1st of each year, such lien to continue until taxes for the ensuing year
were paid. The United States acquired title to certain lands after October r,
1936, but before the final 1937 assessment was made and the rate for county
taxes set. None of the 1937 taxes were due. The United States did not pay
the taxes, and on their becoming delinquent, sued to quiet title. Held, by a
unanimous court, that although Alabama could not foreclose the lien without
obtaining the consent of the federal government to be sued, the United States
could not have the state's lien declared invalid. United States v. Alabama, 313
u. s. 274, 61 s. Ct. IOII (1941).
It is well settled that lands owned by the United States cannot be taxed
by a state.2 The federal government's argument for invalidating the lien in the
principal case was that the amount of the taxes, rates and assessment values not
having been fixed, the taxes had not been "imposed" 8 when the United States

1

Ala. Gen. Acts (1935), No. 194, § 372, p. 566; Ala. Code (1940), tit. 51,

§ 884.
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, II7 U.S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670 (1886).
A tax cannot be said to be "imposed" before assessment. Re H. D. McKenzie
Co., [1928] 1 Dom. L. R. 336.
2

8

RECENT DECISIONS

acquired title, for the statute did not "impose taxes" but merely "secured their
payment."" Where property acquired by the United States is subject to an
inchoate tax lien, the federal courts have held that the lien is void if the tax is
not "imposed" until after government acquisition. 5 Thus the principal case seems
to be an exception to the rule that there can be no lien where there is no obligation to pay 6 or when the assessment has not yet been made. 7 The traditional
theory behind an inchoate lien is that although the lien does not spring into
existence until the tax is due as an enforceable debt, the lien then relates back
to the date :fixed by the statute. 8 On this theory, since the tax in the principal
case had never become a debt enforceable against the United States, no complete
or subsisting lien ever attached,9 so none could relate back. 10 Alabama had attempted to create a lien as of the tax day. 11 Since this lien, if valid at all, could
be effective only as against subsequent purchasers 12 from the government, there
is in a sense a taxation of federal property, since the amount of the 1937 taxes,
4
Since the statute has no effect unless taxes are imposed, the lien does not become "fixed and final until the completion of levy and assessment."
5
United-States v. Pierce County, (D. C. Wash. 19iz) 193 F. 529.
6
Hill v. Smithville Independent School District, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 239
S. W. 987, affd. (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) 251 S. W. 209; State v. Snohomish
County, 71 Wash. 320, 128 P. 667 (1912).
1 Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 655 (1873); Bannon
v. Burnes, (C. C. Mo. 1889) 39 F. 892; BLAcK, TAX T1TLEs, 2d ed., § 189 (1893).
8
Gillmor v. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932 (1904); Territory v. Perrin, 9
Ariz. 316, 83 P. 361 (1905).
9
But the question may be academic, for when the United States sells the land,
the tax will become an enforceable debt and the lien will then immediately attach
and relate back to the tax day.
10
Thus in a case very similar to the principal case, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the state, which had acquired property while the county's tax lien
was inchoate, could have the lien invalidated. State v. Snohomish County, 71 Wash.
320, 128 P. 667 (1912). Also, in United States v. Pierce County, (D. C. Wash. 1912)
193 F. 529, a county tax lien on federal land arising under the same Washington
statute was invalidated. Although the statute in these cases provided that the lien was
to attach at a later date as between granter and grantee, this provision was not the basis
of either decision.
11 The tax day is the day when returns are to be made and values fixed. Though
statutes providing for an inchoate tax lien before taxes are assessed are common, the
time when the lien attaches varies considerably from state to state. For the common
law and statutory rule in each jurisdiction, see 61 C. J. 922-924 (1933).
12 Driggers v. Cassaday, 71 Ala. 529 (1883); State v. Alabama Educational Foundation, 231 Ala. II, 163 So. 527 (1934). The Supreme Court has previously recognized the validity of such inchoate liens as binding on subsequent purchasers with the
liability relating back to an earlier date when the amount of the tax is ascertained.
Osterberg v. Union Trust Co., 93 U. S. 424 (1876); People of New York v. Tax
Commissioners, 104 U.S. 466 (1881). The Court in the principal case relies strongly
on New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 53 S. Ct. 323 (1933), in which there is
dictum pointing out that such a lien is effective for some purposes though its amount
be undetermined. The case is weak authority, however, since the actual decision subordinated the state's lien to a federal claim, pointing out that the lien is not "perfect
and specific" but serves "merely as a caveat of a more perfect lien to come."
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secured by a lien, would be reflected in the price the government could command for the property.18 Moreover, if a state, unhampered by the Federal Constitution, may acquire a lien on the tax day, there would appear to be no reason
why it could not acquire it much earlier.14 The state contended that the proper
remedy, of the United States is to plead immunity from suit when the state
attempts to foreclose the lien. It would seem, however, that the objective of the
United States is to sell the land free from the lien rather than merely to protect
itself against foreclosure. 15 It is questionable whether this case indicates that the
Court has retreated from its traditional position that land owned by the United
States is immune from state taxation. While there is no recent case in point,
it is conceivable that the Court has recently departed so far from the doctrine
of Collector v. Day 16 in restricting intergovernmental immunities 17 that it is
now ready to permit a state to tax federal lands.18 If such a direct form of tax
is valid, there would seem to be little left of the rule of intergovernmental immunities except as against discriminatory and prohibitively high taxes.19

David N. Mills
18
If the Court had invalidated this lien, there would no danger of the United
States getting an unearned profit by buying property burdened with liens and later
selling it at a higher price free from such liens. In order to escape the lien burden, it
would have to buy the land before the tax was assessed or due, i.e., before there were
any real burdens on it which would reduce its value.
14
Thus its legislature may, for example, enact that as of the day of the statute,
the state imposes a lien for all future taxes on all land in the state, and thereby in effect
neutralize the tax-exemption as to all property thereafter acquired by the United States.
15 If immunity from suit were an effective remedy, it would never be necessary
to plead the tax immunity of federal lands.
16
II Wall. (78 U. S.) II3 (1871).
17
As in Helvering v. Gehrhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1937), and
Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595
(1938).
18 But the immunity is not entirely judge-made law, for all states entering the
Union after Louisiana were admitted on the condition that they would not tax land
owned by the United States. Similarly state constitutions and statutes commonly provide for such immunity. See 26 R. C. L. 96 (1920). Thus by upholding the indirect
method of an inchoate lien, the Court goes even farther than would be the case had
it said that this was a permissible tax on federal property, for the method here employed also circumvents any statutory immunity.
19 The Court may now take the position that since a state may so easily circumvent the immunity by the device of an inchoate tax lien, it might just as well be allowed
to tax federal property directly. But a more logical intermediate step is indicated, however, when the Court declares, "we perceive no reason why the United States •••
should stand, so far as the existence of liens is concerned, in any different position
from that of other purchasers.. ~ ." Principal case, 313 U. S. 274 at 282. The
Court thus suggests that perhaps it might allow a state to acquire a tax lien against the
United States in the first instance, rather than merely to hold the United States as a
subsequent purchaser with notice of an existing lien. In effect this would altogether
wipe out the tax immunity of lands owned by the United States; for governmental
immunity from suit without its consent already protects the federal government from
foreclosure.

